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A DOLLAR FOR YOUR THOUGHTS:  
DETERMINING WHETHER NOMINAL DAMAGES 
PREVENT AN OTHERWISE MOOT CASE FROM 
BEING AN ADVISORY OPINION 
Maura B. Grealish* 
 
This Note examines whether nominal damages should sustain an otherwise 
moot constitutional claim.  A majority of circuit courts have held that a lone 
claim for nominal damages is sufficient.  A minority of circuit courts have 
determined that nominal damages are insufficient because there is no 
practical effect in determining such a case.  The courts in the minority 
analogize nominal damages to declaratory judgments and justify their 
rulings on the basis of judicial economy.  This Note proposes that the 
minority rule is impermissible under current precedent from the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  However, this Note also proposes that the majority rule be 
adjusted slightly to address the concerns and criticisms of the minority rule.  
This Note argues that courts should scrutinize the lone claim for nominal 
damages and require that plaintiffs allege a specific incident of constitutional 
deprivation to ensure that there is an ongoing case and controversy.  Finally, 
this Note suggests that the Supreme Court provide more guidance to federal 
courts on the doctrine of mootness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a claim for nominal damages,1 the value of a dollar is priceless.  
Litigation will likely cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and require the 
dedication of precious judicial resources.2  But to the plaintiff, the dollar has 
no monetary value; rather, it is a symbolic gesture that society values his or 
her absolute rights, such as constitutional rights.3  Because nominal damages 
may be sought when there is no other available remedy, they provide 
plaintiffs the opportunity to request a judicial check on executive and 
 
 1. Nominal damages are a trivial sum, such as one dollar, that is awarded to the plaintiff 
when the defendant has violated the plaintiff’s legal rights but the plaintiff is unable to prove 
damages under another measure. Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (D.D.C. 1974); 
DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES 225 (3d ed. 2018). 
 2. See generally EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES:  MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (2010), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CostCiv1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM3B-BW7Q] 
(presenting a multivariate analysis of litigation costs in 2008). 
 3. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text. 
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legislative power.  However, the judiciary does not have unlimited power and 
must avoid issuing impermissible advisory opinions.4  When a plaintiff 
requests only nominal damages, the judiciary is in a precarious position and 
must balance the vindication of absolute rights, the risk of running afoul of 
its constitutionally limited powers, and concerns about its limited resources.5 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a sole remaining 
claim for nominal damages can save an otherwise moot constitutional claim.6  
This issue may arise when the cause for a plaintiff’s complaint is no longer 
an ongoing issue, such as where a challenged statute is repealed.7  Many 
federal appellate courts have considered this issue, but they have not agreed 
on how to resolve it.  A majority of circuit courts have held that nominal 
damages will prevent a moot constitutional claim from being dismissed.8  
Recently, a small number of courts have adopted an opposing rule, which 
would potentially bar plaintiffs from obtaining vindication for violations of 
their constitutional rights.9 
There are two apparent reasons this conflict has developed.  First, there are 
differing interpretations of nominal damages:  they may be seen either as a 
retrospective remedy to vindicate constitutional deprivations10 or merely as 
a vehicle for declaratory judgments.11  Second, this conflict likely developed 
because the Supreme Court has failed to clearly define the boundary between 
prudential and constitutional mootness.12 
This Note argues that nominal damages are more than just a vehicle for 
declaratory judgments due to their special purpose in constitutional law.13  
This Note proposes a flexible standard whereby the courts should take a 
second look to scrutinize claims for nominal damages to ensure they are 
sufficiently pled.14  This standard should be applied in determining whether 
a claim for nominal damages may stand and adjusts the majority rule to 
address the legitimate concerns of the courts that apply the minority rule.15  
 
 4. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Daniel Harris Brean, Ending Unreasonable Royalties:  Why Nominal Damages 
Are Adequate to Compensate Patent Assertion Entities for Infringement, 39 VT. L. REV. 867, 
880 n.36 (2015). 
 6. See Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1265 (10th Cir. 
2004) (McConnell, J., concurring). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra note 143 (collecting pertinent circuit court cases). 
 9. The Eleventh and Eighth Circuits and district courts in the Seventh and First Circuits 
have adopted this rule. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael L. Wells, Attorney’s Fees, Nominal Damages, and 
Section 1983 Litigation, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 829, 876 (2016). 
 11. See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 610 (6th Cir. 2008); Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc. v. Franklin County, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158 (S.D. Ind. 2015) 
(“Under Seventh Circuit case law, nominal damages are more akin to declaratory relief, and 
should be subject to the same justiciability principles.”). 
 12. See infra Part III.C. 
 13. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
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Finally, this Note provides guidance on how the Supreme Court could clarify 
the prudential and constitutional aspects of the mootness doctrine. 
Part I of this Note provides the background of the relevant legal doctrines, 
nominal damages, and mootness.  First, it gives a brief overview of damages, 
declaratory judgments, and injunctive relief.  It then defines nominal 
damages generally and in the context of constitutional violations.  Finally, 
Part I examines the requirements and purposes of mootness and discusses 
perspectives on the constitutional versus prudential nature of mootness.  Part 
II analyzes the majority and minority rules.  Part III proposes that the 
majority rule should be adjusted to a flexible, yet more exacting, standard.  
In conclusion, Part III then suggests that this conflict developed because of a 
lack of guidance on the doctrine of mootness and outlines different models 
the Supreme Court could adopt. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF REMEDIES AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
To understand how this conflict developed, it is necessary to understand 
nominal damages as a remedy as well as mootness as a requirement of federal 
jurisdiction.  Part I.A overviews remedies and explains the special function 
of nominal damages.  Part I.B gives a brief overview of federal jurisdiction 
and explains mootness in depth. 
A.  Remedies 
Lawsuits are typically brought when a plaintiff has suffered a legally 
recognized harm or a violation of his or her legal rights.  Once the court has 
determined that the plaintiff’s substantive rights have been violated, or will 
be violated, it must determine how to remedy that violation.  A remedy is the 
means by which rights are enforced or violations of rights are prevented, 
redressed, or compensated.16  Part I.A.1 provides a brief overview of 
compensatory damages.17  Part I.A.2 explains injunctive and declaratory 
relief.  Part I.A.3 then highlights the unique nature of nominal damages as a 
remedy that combines aspects of damages and declaratory judgment.  Finally, 
Part I.A.4 describes the function of nominal damages in protecting 
individuals’ constitutional rights. 
1.  Compensatory Damages 
It is a “cardinal principal . . . in Anglo-American law” that damages 
compensate the plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant’s breach of 
 
 16. Remedy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “remedy” as “[t]he 
means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong”). 
 17. Punitive and other types of noncompensatory damages are outside the scope of this 
Note and will not be discussed.  Nominal damages are discussed separately from 
compensatory damages because they serve a distinct function, separate from compensation. 
See infra Part I.B. 
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duty.18  However, different categories of damages serve distinct purposes.19  
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 901 describes the purpose of damages 
as to:  “(a) give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms; (b) to 
determine rights; (c) punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and 
(d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful self-
help.”20 
The purpose of compensatory damages is to make the victim whole 
again—to make it as if the harm never happened.21  These damages are not 
intended to be a windfall for the plaintiff, but rather to indemnify the plaintiff 
for his or her harm or loss that the defendant’s wrongful conduct caused.22  
Compensable harm includes not just “out-of-pocket loss and other monetary 
harms, but also such injuries as ‘impairment of reputation . . . , personal 
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’”23 
2.  Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
Injunctive relief serves a different function than damages.  Injunctions 
cannot be ordered to redress past wrongs but rather offer prospective relief.24  
They prevent future violations of law and future harm, whereas damages, 
generally, compensate for harm that has already occurred.  When the court 
orders injunctive relief, it directs the defendant to take or to refrain from 
taking some particular action.25  If the defendant fails to comply, he or she 
may be held in contempt of court.26 
Congress enacted the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,27 which 
authorizes courts to issue declaratory judgments, as an alternative remedy to 
injunctive relief.28  Congress intended for plaintiffs to seek declaratory relief 
 
 18. 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 25.1 (3d ed. 
2007); see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986); Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) cmt. a, 
§ 903(a) cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 19. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Cooper 
Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp. Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra 
note 1, at 3–4, 215–17 (discussing the various compensatory and noncompensatory purposes 
of damages). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 21. See United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958); see also Chronister 
Oil Co. v. Unocal Ref. & Mktg., 34 F.3d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the point of 
compensatory damages is “to put the victim where he would have been had the breach or tort 
not taken place”). 
 22. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416. 
 23. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307 (alteration in original) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). 
 24. See Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119, 124 (1892). 
 25. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES:  CASES AND MATERIALS 235 
(3d ed. 2002). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012). 
 28. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 467 (1974) (“The express purpose of the 
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was to provide a milder alternative to the injunction 
remedy.” (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111–15 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
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to test the constitutionality of statutes without fear of prosecution.29  Without 
this form of relief, testing such constitutionality might require the party to 
violate the statute and present this argument as a defense.30  In doing so, the 
plaintiff would risk losing the argument and being convicted or otherwise 
penalized. 
Declaratory judgments allow courts to resolve disputes through a legal 
determination of parties’ rights, but the court does not enter a direct order 
enforcing those rights.31  The purpose of declaratory judgments is to clarify 
legal relationships before rights have been violated.32  Although there is no 
direct enforceable order, declaratory relief helps resolve legal uncertainty and 
prevents harm from occurring.33  For example, a potential defendant in a 
patent infringement suit might seek a declaratory judgment that a patent is 
invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.34  Therefore, the parties are able to 
guide their behavior depending on the judicial determination with respect to 
the patent. 
The Supreme Court has held that declaratory judgments are an improper 
remedy in the absence of an ongoing case or controversy.35  If there is no 
controversy, this remedy runs afoul of the prohibition on advisory opinions 
because courts would be academically advising on the law.36  Congress did 
not intend for this remedy to be used by those “merely curious or dubious as 
to the true state of the law.”37  In determining whether an action for 
declaratory judgment meets the case-or-controversy requirement, the 
Supreme Court requires “that the dispute be ‘definite and concrete, touching 
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests’; and that it be 
‘real and substantial’ and ‘admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a 
conclusive character.’”38 
 
 29. See Bykofsky v. Middletown, 389 F. Supp. 836, 846 (M.D. Pa. 1975). 
 30. See LAYCOCK, supra note 25, at 523 (discussing declaratory judgment as an option to 
find out what a party’s rights were without incurring the risk of additional penalties by 
violating the statute).  Sometimes the same can be accomplished by enjoining enforcement of 
the statute. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 7.  However, injunctive relief, unlike 
declaratory judgment, requires a showing of irreparable harm, which makes it more difficult 
to show that this remedy is appropriate. See LAYCOCK, supra note 25, at 517; see also Steffel 
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1972) (“Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to act 
as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction and to be utilized to test the 
constitutionality of state criminal statutes in cases where injunctive relief would be 
unavailable . . . .”). 
 31. See LAYCOCK, supra note 25, at 3–4. 
 32. See Alsager v. Dist. Court, 384 F. Supp. 643, 648 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Nat’l Union Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Lippert Bros., 233 F. Supp. 650, 656 (D. Neb. 1964). 
 33. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 7. 
 34. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). 
 35. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937). 
 36. See id. at 241. 
 37. Fair v. Adams, 233 F. Supp. 310, 312 (N.D. Fla. 1964). 
 38. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (alteration in original) (quoting Haworth, 300 U.S. at 
240–41). 
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3.  Nominal Damages:  Why Bother Suing for One Dollar? 
Lawsuits are expensive, so suing for one dollar begs the question, why 
bother?39  Taylor Swift, an American pop singer, was awarded one dollar in 
a suit for sexual assault.  Her attorney told the jury that although it was only 
a “single symbolic dollar, the value [of that dollar] is immeasurable to all 
women in this situation.”40  She was widely praised for standing up for 
women and taking a stand against her assailant.41 
Nominal damages are not compensatory, but they serve a special function 
in the American legal system.42  Nominal damages are a trivial sum, such as 
one dollar, which are awarded to the plaintiff when the defendant has violated 
the plaintiff’s legal rights, but the plaintiff is unable to prove damages under 
another measure.43  Nominal damages are not appropriate where damages are 
a required element of a cause of action, such as in an action for negligence.44  
Nominal damages are not meant to be reparative in compensation, but they 
“publicly affirm that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights”45 and can 
be sought so that the plaintiff obtains an authoritative judicial determination 
of the parties’ legal rights.46  Additionally, courts often award nominal 
damages to plaintiffs who cannot show that they suffered an actual injury, 
but who can show that they were deprived of “certain ‘absolute’ rights.”47 
Nominal damages can be considered a precursor to the previously 
impermissible declaratory relief remedy later established by statute.48  
Central to this conflict, some courts consider nominal damages a mere 
 
 39. See, e.g., Moore v. Liszewski, 838 F.3d 877, 879 (7th Cir. 2016) (“If the plaintiff goes 
around bragging that he won his suit, and is asked what exactly he won, and replies ‘$1 dollar,’ 
he’ll be laughed at.”); Azimi v. Jordan’s Meats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228, 237 (1st Cir. 2006) (“One 
might ask why the parties should care on appeal about whether a nominal damages award, for 
as little as one dollar, should be ordered.”). 
 40. See Phoebe Lett, Opinion, Taylor Swift’s Priceless Dollar, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/opinion/taylor-swift-groping-assault.html 
[https://perma.cc/2A8E-UGW6]. 
 41. Time Magazine recognized Taylor Swift in its 2017 Person of the Year issue as one 
of the “Silence Breakers” who inspired woman to speak out about harassment. See Stephanie 
Zacharek et al., The Silence Breakers, TIME, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-
silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/Q9UF-UQZP] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 42. See LAYCOCK, supra note 25, at 561 (discussing the special function of nominal 
damages in constitutional law). 
 43. See Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (D.D.C. 1974); DOBBS & ROBERTS, 
supra note 1, at 225. 
 44. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 225. 
 45. See Gregory C. Keating, Is There Really No Liability Without Fault?:  A Critique of 
Goldberg & Zipursky, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 24, 32 n.47 (2017). 
 46. See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
nominal damages only have a declaratory effect); see also LAYCOCK, supra note 25, at 561 
(describing the declaratory function of nominal damages where there is no available formal 
declaratory relief). 
 47. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978); see infra Part I.A.4. 
 48. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 226 (discussing how claims for nominal 
damages may have been used to get issues before a court before declaratory judgments were 
a recognized remedy). 
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vehicle for declaratory judgment.49  One court stated that nominal damages 
have “only declaratory effect and do not otherwise alter the legal rights or 
obligations of the parties . . . .  [T]hey can sometimes constitute effectual 
relief, but only with respect to future dealings between the parties.”50 
However, a plaintiff’s ability to bring a claim for nominal damages when 
declaratory relief is impermissible highlights an important distinction 
between nominal damages and declaratory relief.51  Courts award nominal 
damages to vindicate plaintiffs for past harm, while declaratory relief 
provides a prospective determination of rights before harm has occurred.52  
Nominal damages are most appropriate when there has been “a one-off event 
that affected [the plaintiff] in the past and will not (under modern standing 
and ripeness decisions) support a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief.”53  
For example, a student who has graduated from school or a prisoner who has 
been released from prison will no longer have a live claim for injunctive or 
declaratory relief against his or her school or prison respectively,54 but he or 
she may still have a claim for nominal damages.  Despite this difference, 
nominal damages and declaratory relief may have the same practical effect 
or outcome—a judicial determination of the parties’ rights.55 
Nominal damages can also serve as a vehicle for nonpecuniary damages 
and attorneys’ fees.56  Courts can award noneconomic monetary damages, 
such as those for pain and suffering or punitive damages, in conjunction with 
nominal damages.57  Additionally, a plaintiff who is awarded nominal 
damages is considered the prevailing party and may be eligible to receive 
 
 49. See Morrison, 521 F.3d at 610; Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Franklin 
County, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (“Under Seventh Circuit case law, 
nominal damages are more akin to declaratory relief, and should be subject to the same 
justiciability principles.”). 
 50. Morrison, 521 F.3d at 610–11 (alterations in original) (quoting Utah Animal Rights 
Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1267–68 (10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., 
concurring)). 
 51. See LAYCOCK, supra note 25, at 561 (describing instances where nominal damages 
can be sought but declaratory judgment is unavailable); see also DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra 
note 1, at 7 (“The chief problem in obtaining declaratory relief lies in the rules of justiciability:  
rules that courts will not issue advisory opinions, decide moot cases or those that are not ripe, 
or deal in any dispute that does not count as a case or controversy.”). 
 52. See LAYCOCK, supra note 25, at 561 (describing instances where nominal damages 
can be sought but declaratory judgment is unavailable). 
 53. James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma:  Constitutional Tort 
Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1606 (2011). 
 54. Such an individual may be able to bring his or her case if the claim falls within an 
exception to mootness, such as that for class certification. See supra Part I.B.2.b for a 
discussion about the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. 
 55. See Moore v. Liszewski, 838 F.3d 877, 879 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that an award for 
nominal damages is not functionally an award for damages at all); Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 
661, 673 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that nominal damages “amount[] to an implicit declaration of 
the same things that plaintiffs are requesting in their motion for declaratory relief”). 
 56. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 226. 
 57. See id. at 225–26.  Not all courts allow punitive damages to be awarded in conjunction 
with an award of nominal damages. See LAYCOCK, supra note 25, at 737–38 for a discussion 
of the split among courts. 
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reasonable attorneys’ fees under certain statutes.58  Because there is a chance 
of being awarded attorneys’ fees, a plaintiff may bring a claim for nominal 
damages and hope to shift the cost burden to the defendant.59  However, the 
court’s award of nominal damages does not automatically enable the plaintiff 
to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees as courts may still determine reasonable 
attorneys’ fees to be zero.60 
A plaintiff may also bring a claim for nominal damages because he or she 
is motivated to change the law or challenge the constitutionality of the 
practice or policy.  For example, awards of nominal damages can “prompt a 
municipality to change its policies.”61  In cases where the plaintiff is not 
seeking monetary relief, but instead seeks social change, the case can be 
characterized as public litigation or being brought by “non-Hohfeldian 
plaintiffs.”62  These are ideological plaintiffs that bring claims to enforce 
“legal principles that touch others as directly as themselves and that are 
valued for moral or political reasons independent of economic interests.”63 
4.  Nominal Damages as a Constitutional Remedy 
Nominal damages serve a special purpose in the protection of 
constitutional rights because they may be the only available remedy to the 
plaintiff for a constitutional violation.64  Supreme Court precedent “makes 
clear that nominal damages, and not damages based on some undefinable 
‘value’ of infringed rights, are the appropriate means of ‘vindicating’ rights 
whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.”65  Therefore, 
nominal damages help individuals and courts protect constitutional rights and 
are an important remedy when a plaintiff can establish a violation of a 
 
 58. Most circuit courts award reasonable attorneys’ fees in a claim for nominal damages. 
See Anthony DiSarro, A Farewell to Harms:  Against Presuming Irreparable Injury in 
Constitutional Litigation, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 793 nn.235–36 (2012). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 117 (1992) (if the “victory is purely technical or 
de minimis, a district court need not go through the usual complexities involved in calculating 
attorney’s fees”). 
 61. DiSarro, supra note 58, at 743, 769 (“[C]ursory review of annual reports prepared and 
distributed by municipal law departments reveals that municipalities measure themselves by 
the success rate in Section 1983 litigation and the aggregate amount of damages awarded 
against their agents.”); see, e.g., Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 318 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (observing that nominal damage awards could “encourage the municipality to 
reform the patterns and practices that led to constitutional violations, as well as alert the 
municipality and its citizenry to the issue”); Cadiz v. Kruger, No. 06-CV-5463, 2007 WL 
4293976, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007) (noting that a nominal-damages verdict against the 
city could provide a greater incentive for the city to make a change than a damages award 
against individual officers because the city could dismiss the latter as the conduct of rogue 
employees). 
 62. Non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs are those that “invoke the judicial power to redress injuries 
not easily definable in terms of personal, financial loss or other harms actionable at common 
law.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies and Public Law Litigation:  Notes on 
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1984). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). 
 65. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986). 
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constitutional right but is unable to demonstrate a compensable injury.  In 
these cases, the plaintiff need only prove a constitutional violation to recover 
nominal damages and vindicate their rights.66 
Where harm cannot be shown, the plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory 
damages, but he or she is entitled67 to nominal damages.68  Additionally, the 
plaintiff may not be entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief if the 
constitutional violation is one that occurred in the past and is neither ongoing 
nor reasonably expected to occur in the future.69  Therefore, without the 
remedy of nominal damages, one-off events that deprive individuals of 
constitutional rights but cause no harm may not be vindicated.70 
B.  Determining Federal Jurisdiction:  What Is a Proper Dispute? 
There are three doctrines that control whether a case may be heard in 
federal court:  ripeness, standing, and mootness.71  If a claim fails to meet 
one of these requirements, federal courts cannot reach the merits of the case.  
Part I.B.1 discusses federal jurisdiction and the requirement that a plaintiff’s 
claim not be moot.  Part I.B.2 discusses the constitutional and prudential 
aspects of mootness and uses the exceptions to mootness to illustrate the 
prudential considerations of this doctrine. 
1.  Overview of Federal Jurisdiction 
Federal jurisdiction is limited to “cases” or “controversies”72 where a 
litigant has suffered some actual injury that can be redressed.73  Federal 
courts cannot hear or decide cases that will not affect the rights of the parties 
before them.74  If there is no remedy available, or if the court’s decision will 
not affect the rights of the parties before it, the order would be an 
impermissible advisory opinion.75  If that is the case, the court must dismiss 
 
 66. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266. 
 67. See Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 123 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
district court erred in instructing the jury that an award of nominal damages was permissible 
rather than mandatory if they concluded that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated). 
 68. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308 n.11; Carey, 435 U.S. at 266. 
 69. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (holding that claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief are moot because “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not 
in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied 
by any continuing, present adverse effects” (alterations in original) (quoting O’Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974))). 
 70. See Pfander, supra note 53, at 1606. 
 71. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 55, 119, 131 (6th ed. 2012).  
Ripeness “seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because the injury is 
speculative and may never occur from those cases that are appropriate for federal court 
action.” Id. at 119.  Ripeness will not be discussed further because it is outside the scope of 
this Note. 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 73. See Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70, 78 (1983); Williams v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 74. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). 
 75. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989). 
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the claim and refrain from entering a judgment.  In Flast v. Cohen,76 Chief 
Justice Earl Warren explained that the jurisdictional requirements of 
ripeness, standing, and mootness serve a two-fold purpose:  to ensure that 
federal courts only adjudicate adversarial questions and to maintain 
separation of powers.77 
Standing78 and mootness each originate from Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, which grants federal courts the power to hear only “cases” or 
“controversies.”79  Although standing and mootness are similar,80 the 
Supreme Court has applied different standards to evaluate standing and 
mootness because, despite similar requirements, they serve distinct roles.81  
The Supreme Court has recognized that “conduct may be too speculative to 
support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.”82  Several 
courts have held that a sole claim for nominal damages is insufficient to 
confer standing on a plaintiff,83 but at least one court has held that a claim 
for nominal damages is sufficient.84 
2.  If There Is No Dispute—Your Case Is Moot! 
In deciding whether a plaintiff’s claim is moot, courts must assess whether 
the factual or legal circumstances have changed such that there is no longer 
a justiciable question before the court.85  A case becomes moot when a court 
 
 76. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 77. See id. at 95. 
 78. Standing is a threshold jurisdictional requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy to invoke 
federal judicial power. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998).  
The plaintiff must meet three requirements to prove he or she has standing to bring a claim:  
the plaintiff must have suffered (1) an injury-in-fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the actions 
of the defendant and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 80. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (“One commentator 
has defined mootness as ‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:  The requisite personal 
interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue 
throughout its existence (mootness).’” (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication:  The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973))). 
 81. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170 
(2000). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 611 (6th Cir. 2008) (“While we may have 
allowed a nominal-damages claim to go forward in an otherwise-moot case, we are not 
required to relax the basic standing requirement that the relief sought must redress an actual 
injury.”); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:17-00642, 
2017 WL 5473923, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 17, 2017) (holding that the claim of nominal 
damages is insufficient to confer standing), appeal docketed sub nom. Deal v. Mercer Cty. Bd. 
of Educ., No. 17-2429 (4th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017). 
 84. See Advantage Media L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir. 
2006).  However, the Eighth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, has also held that where a 
defendant has amended an ordinance, a claim for nominal damages is insufficient to challenge 
prior versions of the ordinance. See Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 687 
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 85. See Richard K. Greenstein, Bridging the Mootness Gap in Federal Court Class 
Actions, 35 STAN. L. REV. 897, 898 (1983). 
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cannot grant any “effectual relief.”86  Thus, there are two aspects to 
mootness:  First, when the issue itself is no longer ongoing or the parties no 
longer have stake in the outcome.87  This flexible doctrine requires courts to 
practically assess whether a case or controversy remains in light of the 
particular facts at hand.88  The claim must be alive at all stages of the 
controversy, not just when the complaint is filed.89  If a case becomes moot, 
then the court cannot decide the merits of the case unless an exception 
applies.90 
In general, a court will determine a case is moot if: 
“the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally 
cognizable interest in the outcome”; or when subsequent events make it 
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably 
be expected to recur; or when subsequent events make it impossible for the 
court to grant to the prevailing party effectual relief, since “the thing sought 
to be prohibited has been done, and cannot be undone by any order of 
court.”91 
Under the first aspect, an issue becomes moot if, for example, the plaintiff 
cannot show that a “governmental action or policy . . . has adversely affected 
and continues to affect a present interest.”92  Generally, claims for damages 
cannot be moot.93 
A case also becomes moot if the plaintiff no longer has a continued 
“personal stake” in the outcome—a requirement connected to the adversarial 
requirement.94  Courts do not have an investigative arm,95 so they require 
 
 86. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016) (quoting Knox v. Serv. 
Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)); see Citizens for Responsible Gov’t 
State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The crucial 
question is whether ‘granting a present determination of the issues offered . . . will have some 
effect in the real world.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. 
Becker, 186 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999))). 
 87. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400–01 (1980). 
 88. See id.; STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 951 (10th ed. 2013) 
(“[T]his apparently simple concept has become embroidered with distinctions that seem to 
turn less on whether a concrete dispute between the original parties continues to exist and 
more on whether, as a matter of policy, the intervening factors should be allowed to frustrate 
judicial review of publicly important issues.”). 
 89. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). 
 90. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018) (per curiam); 
United States v. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624, 640 (1948); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 546 
(2d Cir. 1942). 
 91. See Parsons Inv. Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 466 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(citations omitted) (first quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969); then 
quoting Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147, 153 (1904)). 
 92. See Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125–26 (1974). 
 93. Claims for damages may be moot if the parties settle or the plaintiff is otherwise made 
whole and seeks no other relief. See Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 77 
(2013) (“[A] claim for damages cannot evade review; it remains live until it is settled [or] 
judicially resolved . . . .”). 
 94. See Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990) (citing City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)). 
 95. See Don B. Kates, Jr. & William T. Barker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings:  
Towards a Coherent Theory, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1385, 1409 (1974). 
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that the parties be adverse; this allows courts to consider the entirety of the 
problem and the parties’ opposing considerations.96  When the plaintiff no 
longer has a personal stake, the plaintiff may not advocate as effectively 
because he or she may not be motivated to bring the same effort needed to 
succeed as one who is facing the real possibility of an unfavorable outcome.97  
If the plaintiff does not sufficiently prosecute his or her case and the court 
makes an error of law, the consequences of this precedent may be grave for 
future parties litigating the same issues.98 
However, a case should not be dismissed as moot if any of the relief sought 
is still available to the plaintiff.99  In Powell v. McCormack,100  Adam 
Clayton Powell, Jr., sued the U.S. House of Representatives for refusing to 
allow him to take his seat in Congress.101  Powell sought a declaratory 
judgment that this action was unconstitutional as well as back pay.102  
However, before a decision could be rendered, he was seated in the next 
House of Representatives, which mooted his claim for injunctive relief.103  
Although injunctive relief was no longer available, the Supreme Court held 
that the case was not moot because Powell still had a claim for relief in the 
form of the money he sought in back pay.104 
a.  Beyond Article III:  The Unclear Boundary of Prudential Mootness 
The common-law doctrine of mootness, a discretionary and prudential 
doctrine,105 predates the Constitution.106  It was not until the late twentieth 
century that mootness developed as a mandatory jurisdictional bar.107  The 
Supreme Court has noted that there are prudential aspects to its mootness 
 
 96. See id. at 1408–09; Note, Cases Moot on Appeal:  A Limit on the Judicial Power, 103 
U. PA. L. REV. 772, 773 (1955) (“This adversary system depends upon self-interest as the 
motive best suited to bring all pertinent facts, policies and legal issues before the court.”). 
 97. See Kates & Barker, supra note 95, at 1409; Note, supra note 96, at 773. 
 98. See Note, supra note 96, at 773. 
 99. See Kates & Barker, supra note 95, at 1390. 
 100. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
 101. See id. at 489–93. 
 102. See id. at 496. 
 103. See id. at 495–96. 
 104. See id. at 496. 
 105. See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 562, 569 (2009) (noting that courts historically dismissed cases as moot because of 
“instrumental concerns, such as conservation of judicial resources, preservation of judicial 
authority, the desire to ensure that issues are litigated by properly motived parties, and the 
desire to prevent collusive cases” (footnotes omitted)). 
 106. See Alton & S. Ry. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 463 F.2d 872, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(“[Mootness] may be usefully referred to as a common law limitation on the duty of a court to 
decide cases presented.”); Hall, supra note 105, at 567–73 (discussing the significant 
differences between nineteenth-century mootness and the current mootness doctrine). 
 107. See Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) (“Our lack of jurisdiction to 
review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which 
the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.”); Hall, 
supra note 105, at 562–64 (discussing recent cases that have taken the position that mootness 
is grounded in Article III but doubting that this was historically the case). 
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jurisprudence that fall outside the boundary of constitutional mootness 
created by the Article III case-and-controversy requirements.108 
Generally, courts begin their mootness inquiry with the Constitution but 
often justify their decision to dismiss109 or their decision to reach the merits 
of the case on the basis of prudential mootness.110  Beyond Article III, courts 
often justify dismissing a case as moot based on judicial economy and 
instrumental concerns.111  It does not seem fair to subject adverse parties, or 
the court system, to onerous litigation when there is no longer a controversy 
and the only result would seem to be personal vindication.112  It seems a 
waste of limited judicial resources to allow moot cases to continue.113  Courts 
also argue that it is not the proper role of federal courts to decide such cases 
and that doing so would diminish the authority of the court system.114  For 
example, in Flast v. Cohen,115 the Supreme Court recognized that “a policy 
limitation is ‘not always clearly distinguished from the constitutional 
limitation.’”116 
b.  Mootness Exceptions:  Illuminating the Prudential Aspects of Mootness 
The Supreme Court has noted that the starting point of the mootness 
inquiry is in the Constitution, but the exceptions to the doctrine are based on 
“practicalities and prudential considerations.”117  Federal courts will hear 
moot claims if they fall under one of four exceptions, generally described as:  
(1) capable of repetition, yet evading review; (2) class certification; 
(3) voluntary cessation; and (4) collateral consequences.118  In Honig v. 
 
 108. See Hall, supra note 105, at 574–75 n.55; see also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 
U.S. 277, 288 (2000) (“Our interest in preventing litigants from attempting to manipulate the 
Court’s jurisdiction to insulate a favorable decision from review further counsels against a 
finding of mootness here.”).  But see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974) (“[P]urely 
practical considerations have never been thought to be controlling by themselves on the issue 
of mootness in this Court.  While [states] may choose to adjudicate a controversy simply 
because of its public importance, and the desirability of . . . statewide decision[s], we are 
limited by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III to adjudication of actual disputes 
between adverse parties.”). 
 109. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 110. The exceptions to the doctrine look “to practicalities and prudential considerations.” 
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 n.11 (1980). 
 111. See Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1675 
(1970).  For a definition of “instrumental concerns,” see supra note 105. 
 112. See Kates & Barker, supra note 95, at 1387. 
 113. See id. at 1433–34 (arguing that judicial economy is concerned with the allocation of 
resources that have not been used rather than what has already been expended). 
 114. See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 611 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Allowing [the case] 
to proceed to determine the constitutionality of an abandoned policy . . . trivializes the 
important business of the federal courts.”). 
 115. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 116. Id. at 97 (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1958)).  Although a distinct 
doctrine, the Court’s reasoning and analysis on standing is instructive on mootness due to the 
similarities between the doctrines. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text. 
 117. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 n.11 (1980). 
 118. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 135–51.  The collateral-consequences exception 
is generally limited to criminal cases:  cases of wrongful conviction and habeas corpus 
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Doe,119 Chief Justice William Rehnquist argued that although there may be 
an attenuated justification for mootness in the Constitution, the exceptions to 
the doctrine imply that the doctrine is not fully a jurisdictional issue.120  
Additionally, Rehnquist argued that if mootness is fully grounded in the 
Constitution, then the federal courts would not be able to override it and 
allow exceptions to the rule because it would be impermissible to do so if 
mootness is solely a constitutional doctrine.121 
In Honig, Rehnquist wrote a concurrence to argue for reconsideration of 
the mootness requirement.122  Rehnquist argued for a relaxed test or an 
additional exception for mootness when supervening events make the case 
moot after the Supreme Court has granted certiorari.123  To justify relaxing 
or suspending the mootness doctrine, Rehnquist argued that the doctrine is 
not fully grounded in the Constitution.124  He looked at the historical 
development of mootness and noted that the earliest cases did not base 
mootness in the Constitution.125  He further argued that the Supreme Court’s 
unique ability to decide federal questions in a way that binds every court in 
the country is a sufficient justification to relax or abandon the doctrine of 
mootness in these instances.126 
To apply the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, there 
are two factors that must be simultaneously present:  “(1) the challenged 
action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or 
expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party [will] be subject to the same action again.”127  Under the 
second prong, it is not sufficient if there are other similarly situated litigants; 
it must be the very same plaintiff, defendant, and injury.  The issue may 
temporarily disappear, making the case moot, but the exception allows the 
issue to be litigated as long as the parties can demonstrate a continued 
personal stake by showing they will likely be injured by recurrence of the 
harm.128 
There is a further subset of cases which highlight the underlying prudential 
considerations of this doctrine.  In these cases, the Court has also relaxed or 
 
petitions. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968) (“[A] criminal case is moot only if 
it is shown that there is no possibility that any legal consequences will be imposed on the basis 
of the challenged conviction.”).  The collateral-consequences exception is not relevant to this 
Note and will not be discussed further. 
 119. 484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
 120. See id. at 331 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[A]n unwillingness to decide moot cases 
may be connected to the case or controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an attenuated 
connection that may be overridden where there are strong reasons to override it.”). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. at 329. 
 123. See id. at 330. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 330–31 (citing Mills v. Green 159 U.S. 651 (1895) and S. Pac. Terminal Co. 
v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911)) (noting that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” 
exception was adopted because of pragmatic considerations, with no mention of Article III). 
 126. See id. at 332. 
 127. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam). 
 128. See S. Pac. Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at 515. 
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done away with the same-party requirement.129  Instead, courts apply the 
exception if there is a high probability that the issue will recur between the 
defendant and other members of the public at large.130  This additional 
exception highlights situations where courts are willing to further relax the 
mootness requirement if the issue is ongoing, but the plaintiff’s personal 
stake may be short-lived and not likely to recur.131 
In applying the class certification exception, courts are more willing to use 
their discretion in deciding whether to allow a claim to proceed even though 
the plaintiff lacks a personal stake in the case.132  A class representative’s 
claim may become moot after class certification is granted, such as where a 
prisoner is seeking to challenge a prison policy and is released from prison.  
However, this does not moot the case or the representative’s status.133  This 
is based on the premise that the unnamed persons acquire legal statuses 
separate from the named plaintiff.134 
A defendant who voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct does not moot 
the underlying controversy unless there is no reasonable possibility that the 
challenged conduct will resume.135  Generally, a case will not be dismissed 
merely because the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant is likely to 
repeat the challenged conduct.136  The defendant has the burden to prove it 
is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably 
be expected to recur.”137  Similar to the “capable of repetition, but evading 
review” exception, courts seek to review ongoing issues, even if the plaintiff 
may lack a personal stake.138 
II.  WHAT IS A SUFFICIENT DISPUTE? 
Mootness disputes typically boil down to the availability of an alternative 
remedy.139  This conflict has developed not because there is disagreement as 
to whether nominal damages are available, but rather a disagreement as to 
 
 129. The Court has relaxed the same-party requirement in abortion cases. See Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (“[H]uman gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come 
to term before the usual appellate process is complete [so that] pregnancy litigation seldom 
will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied.”); 
see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973).  The Court has similarly relaxed the same-
party requirement in election cases. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756–57 (1972); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972). 
 130. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 335–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 131. See Hall, supra note 105, at 563. 
 132. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975). 
 134. See id. at 399–402. 
 135. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 221–24 (2000); Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). 
 136. See Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. City of Los Angeles, 840 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 
2016) (reversing the district court’s decision, which impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 
to the plaintiff); FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 137. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (quoting United States v. Concentrated 
Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). 
 138. See Hall, supra note 105, at 601. 
 139. See Kates & Barker, supra note 95, at 1403. 
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the purpose and function of nominal damages and whether they will affect or 
influence any future conduct.140  In cases where plaintiffs have alleged a 
constitutional deprivation but the conduct is no longer ongoing, courts have 
issued conflicting opinions regarding the mootness of such claims.  Part II.A 
discusses the majority rule, which primarily relies on Supreme Court 
precedent and holds that nominal damages are the appropriate remedy for 
past violations of constitutional rights and therefore warrant a determination 
of the merits of the case.141  Part II.B discusses the viewpoint of a minority 
of courts, which have taken a functionalist approach and looked at the 
practical effects of awarding nominal damages to determine whether the 
parties are still adversarial when the statute—the real cause of the dispute—
has been repealed.142 
A.  Majority Rule:  Nominal Damages Are Always Sufficient 
A vast majority of circuit courts that have ruled on this issue have held that 
a claim for nominal damages will sustain an otherwise moot constitutional 
claim.143  This majority rule differs from the minority rule in its view that 
nominal damages are a retrospective damages award, not a vehicle for a 
declaratory judgment.  Courts rely primarily on Supreme Court precedent, 
which established that nominal damages are the appropriate remedy for a 
constitutional deprivation.144 
The Supreme Court decisions that courts rely on are Carey v. Piphus145 
and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura.146  The Court held in 
Carey,147 and affirmed in Stachura,148 that compensatory damages cannot be 
awarded without some showing of an actual compensable injury and that 
nominal damages are the appropriate remedy in that instance.  Courts have 
 
 140. See Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1263 (10th Cir. 
2004) (McConnell, J., concurring); Kates & Barker, supra note 95, at 1403 (objecting to the 
availability of declaratory judgment on the grounds “that the remedy will be ineffective 
because no future conduct will be influenced by the decree” and noting that “[i]f it can 
confidently be predicted that no future conduct will be affected, then considerations of judicial 
economy would dictate a holding of mootness”). 
 141. See infra Part II.A. 
 142. See infra Part II.B. 
 143. See Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 F.3d 740, 748 n.32 (5th Cir. 2009); Utah 
Animal Rights Coal., 371 F.3d at 1257–58; Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 
862, 872 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313–14 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2001); Amato v. 
City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317–20 (2d Cir. 1999); Henson v. Honor Comm. of 
the Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 72 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983); Murray v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of 
Louisville, 659 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 1981).  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled 
on this issue. PETA v. Gittens, 396 F.3d 416, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“We assume, without 
deciding, that a district court’s award of nominal damages—$1—prevents a case from 
becoming moot on appeal.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 872; Amato, 170 F.3d at 317; Comm. for the First 
Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1526–27 (10th Cir. 1992); Henson, 719 F.2d at 72 
n.5. 
 145. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
 146. 477 U.S. 299 (1986). 
 147. 435 U.S. at 254–55. 
 148. 477 U.S. at 306. 
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reasoned that although the Supreme Court did not “squarely address[] the 
issue,” the cases “necessarily impl[y] that a case is not moot so long as the 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate his constitutional rights through a claim for 
nominal damages.”149 
Courts often rely on this precedent, but a few have further justified their 
rulings by looking to the special purpose of nominal damages in 
constitutional law.150  It tends to be hard for victims of constitutional 
violations to show actual compensable injury, but nevertheless, courts have 
determined that these rights are worthy of vindication, even if only by an 
award of one dollar.151  Such an award balances the recognition of “the 
importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed” 
with an acknowledgement of the “principle that substantial damages should 
be awarded only to compensate actual injury.”152  Further, courts note the 
importance of determining liability not just for the litigant but for society as 
well because holding a government entity liable can encourage reform.153 
Courts further recognize that in a claim for nominal damages, the plaintiff 
is not seeking prospective relief, such as an injunction or declaratory relief, 
but has plausibly alleged a past constitutional harm capable of vindication.154  
Courts allow these claims to be heard because even though the challenged 
conduct has ceased and the court has found that it will not occur again, merely 
repealing the statute does not “erase[] the slate concerning the alleged 
[constitutional] violations.”155 
For example, in Ermold v. Davis,156 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held that a claim for damages was not moot even though a claim for 
 
 149. Ward ex rel. Ward v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 F. App’x 386, 386 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(per curiam); see, e.g., Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 
421, 428 (4th Cir. 2007); Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Murray v. Bd. of Trs., 659 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1981); Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 
578 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1978); Fitzgerald v. City of Portland, No. 14-CV-00053, 2014 WL 
5473026, at *5 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2014). 
 150. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 266); Fitzgerald, 2014 WL 5473026, at *5–6 (noting the 
incongruity that a claim for declaratory relief is moot but a claim for nominal damages is not, 
but justifying this outcome based on the special purpose of nominal damages). 
 151. See Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 871 (“Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights 
plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely 
in monetary terms.” (quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986))); Amato, 
170 F.3d at 317–18. 
 152. Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 871 (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 266). 
 153. See, e.g., Amato, 170 F.3d at 317–18; Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 
F.3d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that nominal damages were an appropriate 
remedy because “[t]he right of free speech . . . must be vigorously defended” and “the 
protection of First Amendment rights is central to guaranteeing society’s capacity for 
democratic self-government”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Arizonans for Official 
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
 154. See Fitzgerald, 2014 WL 5473026, at *5; see also Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 
F.3d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a completed violation of constitutional rights would 
entitle plaintiff to an award of nominal damages). 
 155. See Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1526 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
 156. 855 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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injunctive relief was.157  Although the claim for damages in Ermold was not 
limited to nominal damages, the reasoning of the court is instructive.  In 
Ermold, a same-sex couple was denied a marriage license.158  While the case 
was ongoing, the claim for injunctive relief became moot due to superseding 
law.159  The court held that although the claim for injunctive relief was moot, 
the case would not be dismissed as moot because the plaintiffs were a specific 
set of individuals who sought damages for a particularized harm.160  The 
court noted that the case was not brought merely as a general challenge to a 
policy.161 
B.  Minority Rule:  A Functionalist Approach 
A minority of courts have held that nominal damages are insufficient to 
sustain an otherwise moot constitutional claim if the plaintiff cannot show a 
compensable injury and there is no chance of recurrence.  These courts 
include the Eleventh Circuit and the Eighth Circuit,162 as well as district 
courts in the First and Seventh Circuits.163  Part II.B.1 addresses the 
functionalist approach that the Eleventh Circuit and the district courts in the 
First Circuit have adopted.  Part II.B.2 discusses the bright-line rule the 
Eighth Circuit and district courts in the Seventh Circuit have adopted.  
Finally, Part II.B.3 notes the prudential and judicial economy reasons for this 
rule. 
1.  Flexible Functionalist Approach 
In Flanigan’s Enterprises, Inc. of Georgia v. City of Sandy Springs,164 the 
city of Sandy Springs adopted an ordinance criminalizing the commercial 
distribution of obscene material.165  The Eleventh Circuit originally upheld 
the city ordinance because of binding precedent and encouraged the 
 
 157. See id. at 717. 
 158. Id. at 716. 
 159. Id. at 718. 
 160. Id. at 718–20. 
 161. See id. at 718. 
 162. See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1263–64 
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, 138 S. 
Ct. 1326 (2018); Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 687 (8th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (holding that, where the defendant has amended the ordinance, a plaintiff’s claim for 
nominal damages is moot as to the prior versions of the ordinance because a claim for nominal 
damages “cannot revive an otherwise moot constitutional claim against ‘a regime no longer in 
existence’” (quoting Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 611 (6th Cir. 2008))). 
 163. See, e.g., Soto v. City of Cambridge, 193 F. Supp. 3d 61, 71 (D. Mass. 2016) (holding 
that a claim for nominal damages was insufficient to save the case from being dismissed as 
moot); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., v. Concord Cmty. Schs., 207 F. Supp. 3d 862, 
874 n.7 (N.D. Ind. 2016) (noting that multiple district courts have found nominal damages 
insufficient to save an otherwise moot constitutional claim), aff’d, 885 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 
2018). 
 164. 868 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of 
Sandy Springs, 138 S. Ct. 1326 (2018). 
 165. See id. at 1253. 
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appellants to seek a rehearing en banc to overturn the precedent.166  After the 
Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc, the City Council unanimously 
voted to repeal the portion of the ordinance at issue.167  The court held that 
the repeal of the ordinance mooted the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and 
injunctive relief.168 
The court then had to decide whether a claim for nominal damages would 
be sufficient to save the claim from dismissal as moot and held that it does 
not.169  The Eleventh Circuit took a functional approach and did not foreclose 
the possibility that nominal damages could survive as a lone remedy, but held 
that there needed to be some other “practical effect.”170  First, the court 
distinguished the Supreme Court cases that the majority rule relies on.171  
Next, the court analogized nominal damages as functionally similar to 
declaratory judgment.172  Finally, the court addressed policy concerns.173 
To distinguish Supreme Court precedent, the court reasoned that none of 
the Supreme Court decisions that the majority rule relies on are directly on 
point.174  The court found that Carey was distinguishable because there were 
other damages remedies available to the plaintiff, and the claim was more 
than just a sole claim for nominal damages.175  Next, the court distinguished 
Stachura because that case did not address mootness; rather, it only 
confirmed that nominal damages are the appropriate remedy for a 
constitutional violation that causes no actual provable injury.176  Finally, the 
court distinguished Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona177 because 
nominal damages were not an available remedy, so the Court never reached 
the question of whether they saved the case from mootness.178 
Instead, the court relied on a Supreme Court case on standing, Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment,179 to support its holding.180  In Steel Co., 
the Supreme Court held that “psychic satisfaction” is insufficient to confer 
standing on the plaintiff.181  The Eleventh Circuit similarly found the claim 
for nominal damages would only result in psychic satisfaction, or judicial 
 
 166. See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 831 F.3d 1342, 1348 
(11th Cir. 2016) (“Therefore, unless and until our holding in Williams IV is overruled en banc, 
or by the Supreme Court, we are bound to follow it. . . .  Appellants are free to petition the 
court to reconsider our decision en banc, and we encourage them to do so.”), vacated on reh’g 
en banc, 868 F.3d 1248 (2017). 
 167. See Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1254. 
 168. See id. at 1263. 
 169. See id. at 1263–64. 
 170. See id. at 1264. 
 171. See id. at 1265–68. 
 172. See id. at 1268–69. 
 173. See id. at 1270. 
 174. See id. at 1265. 
 175. See id. at 1265–66 & n.18. 
 176. See id. 
 177. 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
 178. See Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1267. 
 179. 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 180. See Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1267–68. 
 181. 523 U.S. at 107. 
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validation of an outcome that has already been determined.182  However, this 
is not to say that the court in Flanigan’s Enterprises did not consider 
constitutional violations to be a harm deserving of vindication.  The court 
reasoned there was no practical effect because the real dispute, repealing the 
statute, was resolved and there was no longer a live dispute.183  Similarly, 
Judge Michael McConnell, in his concurrence in Utah Animal Rights 
Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp.,184 compared constitutional violations to 
actions for libel or trespassing where there is some other dispute that satisfies 
the “case” or “controversy” requirement.185  Judge McConnell reasoned that 
where there is some ongoing dispute, there is merit in allowing the case to 
continue to a judicial determination because it will affect the parties’ 
rights.186 
Next, the court held that nominal damages function as a declaratory 
judgment and therefore should be treated the same under the law.187  The 
court noted that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to 
expand the type of remedies available, but not increase federal 
jurisdiction.188  It explained that neither nominal damages nor declaratory 
relief is itself an independent source of jurisdiction.189  The court then 
reasoned that because declaratory judgment is not available as a remedy for 
an otherwise moot case, neither should nominal damages be.190 
The court did not adopt a bright-line rule and noted there would be 
instances where a sole remaining claim for nominal damages would not be 
moot.191  The court noted that if an alleged constitutional violation was still 
a live dispute, the claim would not be moot even if the only remedy available 
is nominal damages.192  The court did not define what would be considered 
a live dispute or ongoing controversy, nor what a practical effect of a claim 
for nominal damages would be.193  For example, the court could have limited 
its holding to a statute or ordinance that had never been enforced but 
neglected to do so. 
 
 182. See Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1268. 
 183. See id. at 1264–65. 
 184. 371 F.3d 1248, 1262 (10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring). 
 185. See id. at 1264. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1264. 
 188. See id. at 1268 (citing Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960)). 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. at 1263 n.12. 
 192. See id. at 1263–64. 
 193. See id. at 1273–74 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
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The First Circuit has not ruled directly on this issue194 and district courts 
in the First Circuit have been inconsistent in their rulings.195  In Soto v. City 
of Cambridge,196 the court held that the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and 
declaratory relief were moot because the city repealed the ordinance and 
nominal damages were insufficient to save the otherwise moot case.197  
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the court in Soto recognized that this is not a 
bright-line rule, and there are cases where a sole remaining claim for nominal 
damages will be sufficient; however, where the ordinance has been repealed, 
the court held the case should be dismissed as moot.198  Similar to the 
reasoning in the Eleventh Circuit, the court in Soto reasoned it would be 
inconsistent and would “accomplish nothing” if it allowed the claim for 
nominal damages to go forward while the claim for declaratory relief is 
moot.199  Conversely, in Fitzgerald v. City of Portland,200 the District Court 
of Maine touched upon the oddity that nominal damages and declaratory 
relief are functionally the same.201  However, the court ultimately held that 
it was appropriate to allow the claim for nominal damages to be heard 
because the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a past constitutional harm 
capable of vindication.”202 
Although these district courts in the First Circuit appear to be inconsistent, 
both employ a flexible approach that focuses on the alleged harm.  In Soto, 
the court did not hold that nominal damages will never save an otherwise 
moot constitutional claim, similar to the court in Flanigan’s Enterprises.203  
Rather, the court took a closer look to determine whether there was still an 
 
 194. See ACLU v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 53 n.7 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(noting that nominal damages are unavailable as a remedy but not discussing whether this 
would have saved the case from dismissal); Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 n.5 (1st Cir. 
2011) (holding that a claim for nominal damages and punitive damages saves an otherwise 
moot claim from dismissal); Cty. Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 
2002) (discussing that a claim for damages may save a case from mootness, but determining 
that the plaintiff had waived its claim to nominal damages); Anthony v. Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 494 (D. Mass. 1976) (holding that the claim for nominal 
damages was incidental to relief sought and could not save the case from mootness), rev’d on 
other grounds, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).  But see Fitzgerald v. City of Portland, No. 14-CV-00053, 
2014 WL 5473026, at *5 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2014) (holding that a claim for nominal damages 
is sufficient to save an otherwise moot case from dismissal). 
 195. Compare Duffy v. Quattrocchi, 576 F. Supp. 336, 342 (D.R.I. 1983) (holding that 
“where the inquiry is mootness vel non, the possibility of an award of nominal damages will 
not keep an otherwise deflated claim afloat”), and Soto v. City of Cambridge, 193 F. Supp. 3d 
61, 71 (D. Mass. 2016), with Fitzgerald, 2014 WL 5473026, at *6 (holding that the claim is 
not moot because the plaintiffs alleged a plausible constitutional violation and were entitled 
to nominal damages). 
 196. 193 F. Supp. 3d 61 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 197. See id. at 71 (citing Duffy, 576 F. Supp. at 342). 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. at 72. 
 200. No. 14-CV-00053, 2014 WL 5473026 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2014). 
 201. See id. at *20. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1270 n.23 
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, 138 S. 
Ct. 1326 (2018); Soto, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 71. 
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otherwise live dispute or harm to be vindicated.204  This approach is also 
what the court did in Fitzgerald, however, the court in Fitzgerald determined 
the alleged constitutional violation was sufficient to sustain the claim for 
nominal damages as opposed to the court in Soto, which found that there was 
no harm that needed to be vindicated.205  This flexible approach, which 
requires the courts to look at the alleged harm, contrasts with the bright-line 
approach that the majority of appellate courts206 and district courts in the 
Seventh Circuit have applied.207 
2.  Bright-Line Functionalist Approach 
Prior to Flanigan’s Enterprises, district courts in the Seventh Circuit held 
that nominal damages are insufficient to save an otherwise moot 
constitutional claim.208  Their rulings were not limited to instances where 
plaintiffs were unable to show a previous constitutional violation.  In fact, 
courts have applied this rule where the conduct actually occurred, regardless 
of whether harm occurred.209 
The district courts in the Seventh Circuit adopted a bright-line rule that 
nominal damages should be treated the same as declaratory judgment under 
the law, and therefore in instances where declaratory judgment is improper, 
a claim for nominal damages is also improper.210  This bright-line rule treats 
nominal damages as synonymous with declaratory judgment and analyzes 
them as such for the purposes of justiciability.211  District courts within the 
Seventh Circuit have held that “nominal damages are more akin to 
declaratory relief and should be subject to the same justiciability 
 
 204. See Soto, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 71. 
 205. See id.; Fitzgerald, 2014 WL 5473026, at *5. 
 206. See supra Part II.A. 
 207. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 208. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., v. Concord Cmty. Schs., 207 F. Supp. 3d 
862, 874 n.7 (N.D. Ind. 2016) (noting that multiple district courts have found nominal damages 
insufficient to save an otherwise moot constitutional claim), aff’d, 885 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 
2018).  The Seventh Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue. See Concord Cmty. Schs., 885 F.3d 
at 1052–53 (holding that the defendant had not met its burden under voluntary cessation and 
therefore declining to “decide the jurisdictional issue [the defendant] raised—whether a suit 
for nominal damages alone is a sufficiently justiciable controversy under Article III”). 
 209. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Franklin County, 133 F. Supp. 3d 
1154, 1159–60 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (holding that if the government voluntarily ceases the alleged 
illegal conduct, the claims, including claims for nominal damages, should be dismissed as 
moot absent some evidence that the offer is disingenuous); Freedom from Religion Found., 
Inc. v. City of Green Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1031 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (holding that nominal 
damages were insufficient even if the challenged conduct occurred but ceased before the 
lawsuit was filed). 
 210. See, e.g., Franklin County, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1158 (“Under Seventh Circuit case law, 
nominal damages are more akin to declaratory relief, and should be subject to the same 
justiciability principles.”). 
 211. See id. 
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principles.”212  The rulings look to whether the underlying purpose of the suit 
is to stop the challenged conduct rather than to vindicate individual rights.213 
In particular, these courts’ rulings look to whether there is an ongoing 
constitutional violation rather than if any alleged unconstitutional conduct 
has occurred in the past.214  In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. 
Franklin County,215 the court held that because there was no “present proof 
of violation or deprivation, just past allegations, there [wa]s no need to 
vindicate rights.”216  Further, the court noted that seeking to “determine the 
constitutionality of a [repealed] policy . . . vindicates no rights and is not a 
task of the federal courts.”217 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that nominal damages 
are not sufficient to sustain a claim against repealed versions of a statute and 
instead opted to limit the constitutional challenge only to the current version 
of the statute.218  Curiously, the court did not rely on Eighth Circuit precedent 
which held that nominal damages are sufficient to confer standing.219  Rather, 
the court cites Morrison v. Board of Education,220 a Sixth Circuit decision, 
for the proposition that a claim for nominal damages “cannot revive an 
otherwise moot claim against ‘a regime no longer in existence.’”221 
3.  Prudential and Judicial Economy Considerations 
Courts also rely upon prudential and judicial economy concerns to support 
dismissing a sole claim for nominal damages.  This is in contrast to the typical 
invocation of prudential concerns, which courts use to justify reaching the 
merits of a moot claim.222  However, when courts invoke prudential concerns 
to dismiss cases involving nominal damages claims, they focus on wasting 
 
 212. See id. at 1159 (citing City of Green Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 1029–30). 
 213. See id. at 1159–60; City of Green Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d. at 1033 (“[T]he plaintiffs have 
already won.  The Defendants have changed their offending behavior.  Practically speaking, 
the Plaintiffs have a concrete victory that actually changes the circumstances on the ground.  
Having obtained a real-life victory, there is nothing to be gained from spending years and 
thousands of dollars to obtain a piece of paper saying that the Plaintiffs were right.”). 
 214. See Franklin County, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1159–60 (“Because there is no present proof 
of violation or deprivation, just past allegations, there is no need to vindicate rights.  The Court 
finds that [plaintiff]’s legally cognizable interest of eliminating constitutional violations . . . 
no longer exists.  Accordingly, [plaintiff] cannot not use nominal damages to compensate for 
past wrongs . . . .”). 
 215. 133 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (S.D. Ind. 2015). 
 216. See id. at 1159. 
 217. See id. at 1160. 
 218. Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678, 687 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 219. See Advantage Media L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a lone claim for nominal damages is sufficient to confer standing); see also Kuhr 
ex rel. Kuhr v. Millard Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 8:09CV363, 2012 WL 10387, at *2 (D. Ne. Jan. 
3, 2012) (stating that, in Advantage Media, the Eight Circuit spoke to the issue of whether a 
claim for nominal damages was sufficient to prevent dismissal as moot). 
 220. 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 221. Phelps-Roper, 697 F.3d at 687 (quoting Morrison, 521 F.3d at 611). 
 222. The exceptions to the doctrine look “to practicalities and prudential considerations.” 
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 n.11 (1980); see supra Part I.B.2.b. 
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judicial resources and resources of municipalities and plaintiffs’ ability to 
manipulate jurisdiction.223 
Courts and judges are concerned that deciding the merits of cases for 
nominal damages is a waste of precious judicial resources where the outcome 
is already determined.224  Courts are particularly concerned about expending 
judicial resources when the only result is “purely psychic satisfaction” or 
“judicial validation . . . of an outcome that has already been determined.”225  
The concern is that, because the plaintiffs in these cases did not seek 
compensatory damages, there is no retrospective relief for the alleged 
constitutional violation that could have made them whole;226 plaintiffs are 
only seeking the “moral satisfaction” of a judicial ruling.227  Finally, there is 
a concern that “the relief sought must have legal effect in determining the 
present and future rights and obligations of the parties”228 and that awarding 
nominal damages based on a policy no longer in effect would have “no effect 
on the legal rights of the parties.”229  In Morrison, the Sixth Circuit stated 
that “[a]llowing [the claim for nominal damages] to proceed to determine the 
constitutionality of an abandoned policy—in the hope of awarding the 
plaintiff a single dollar—vindicates no interest and trivializes the important 
business of the federal courts.”230 
A further concern is that plaintiffs will be able to manipulate jurisdiction 
and ensure that their case will not be dismissed as moot by pleading a claim 
for nominal damages.231  Although courts will be skeptical of a belated claim 
for nominal damages,232 a plaintiff can likely evade judicial skepticism by 
pleading a claim for nominal damages simultaneously with his or her claim 
for injunctive and declaratory relief. 
 
 223. Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1270 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, 138 S. Ct. 
1326 (2018); Morrison, 521 F.3d at 611 (holding that allowing a claim for nominal damages 
to go through “trivializes the important business of the federal courts”); Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Green Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d. 1019, 1033 (E.D. Wis. 2008) 
(“[T]here is nothing to be gained from spending years and thousands of dollars to obtain a 
piece of paper saying that the Plaintiffs were right.”). 
 224. Morrison, 521 F.3d at 611; Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 322 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s justification that even 
though the plaintiffs can only collect one dollar, there are significant benefits to the litigant 
and society, and instead noting the “wasteful imposition on the trial judge and on the 
taxpayers”). 
 225. Flanigan’s Enters., 868 F.3d at 1268 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 226. See Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1263 (10th Cir. 
2004) (McConnell, J., concurring). 
 227. See id. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. at 1265 (emphasis added). 
 230. See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 611 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 231. See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1270 
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, 138 S. 
Ct. 1326 (2018). 
 232. See Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 861 F.3d 853, 869 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When invoked 
to avoid mootness, a claim for nominal damages not explicitly stated in the complaint bears 
close inspection to ensure it does not fail as a matter of law.”). 
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III.  BALANCING JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND VINDICATING 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Both the majority and minority rules are overly broad.  Adjusting the 
majority rule into a flexible, but more exacting, standard would address 
concerns of the courts in the minority without drastically shifting the law.  
Even though the Supreme Court declined to hear Flanigan’s Enterprises,233 
the circuit courts could adopt this flexible standard without disrupting the 
current law.  Further, this dispute, and the inconsistencies in the law, shows 
that the lower courts would benefit from the Supreme Court’s guidance on 
the issue of prudential mootness. 
This Part argues that courts should adopt a flexible standard, which would 
allow a well-pled claim for nominal damages to sustain an otherwise moot 
constitutional claim.  However, when all but the nominal damages claim is 
dismissed as moot, the courts should take a second, more exacting, look at 
the claim for nominal damages and determine if the plaintiff has alleged a 
particularized deprivation of a constitutional right or harm sufficient to allow 
the claim to continue.  Conclusory allegations that the plaintiff was harmed 
or his or her constitutional rights were violated should not suffice to save the 
case from dismissal. 
Part III.A argues that the minority rule is overbroad and impermissible 
under current Supreme Court precedent.  Part III.B then argues that the 
majority rule can be revised slightly to address the prudential concerns of the 
minority rule without a drastic shift in the current law.  Finally, Part III.C 
discusses how this issue has arisen from a lack of clarity in the mootness 
doctrine and argues that the Supreme Court should provide more guidance in 
this area of the law. 
A.  The Minority Rule Is Overbroad and Impermissible 
The minority rule is overbroad and impermissible under Supreme Court 
precedent.  The minority rules, both the bright-line and flexible standard, are 
overbroad because they include cases where constitutional rights have not 
actually been violated, where there is no claim for compensatory damages, 
and where there is no ongoing dispute.234  The rules also violate Supreme 
Court precedent by disregarding the special purpose nominal damages serve 
in constitutional law and the availability of secondary remedies. 
The minority rules incorrectly treat nominal damages as a declaratory 
judgment by another name and disregard the special purpose this remedy 
serves in constitutional law.235  It is often difficult for plaintiffs to prove or 
quantify the harm they have suffered from constitutional violations,236 but 
 
 233. See Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, 138 S. Ct. 1326 (2018) (mem.) (denying 
certiorari). 
 234. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 235. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 236. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009) 
(discussing the “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating” effects of a strip search on a 
middle school student); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting the feeling 
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the Supreme Court has held that these harms are absolute and appropriately 
vindicated by nominal damages.237  By treating a lone claim for nominal 
damages as insufficient to survive dismissal, courts are in violation of this 
precedent. 
The minority rules, particularly the bright-line approach, wrongly look to 
whether there is an ongoing controversy or a prospective harm that can be 
remedied rather than whether the plaintiff has alleged a past constitutional 
violation.  By only looking to the practical or prospective effect of nominal 
damages, courts will allow past constitutional violations to go unvindicated.  
This rule impermissibly treats nominal damages the same as declaratory 
relief, despite their obvious differences.238  In addition, this rule ignores the 
special purpose of nominal damages in constitutional law.239 
Further, the minority rules impermissibly focuses on the plaintiff’s 
underlying purpose for seeking nominal damages rather than determining 
what remedies are available to the plaintiff based on the injuries he or she 
alleges.240  The Eleventh Circuit, in Flanigan’s Enterprises, noted that the 
complaint prayed predominantly for declaratory and injunctive relief and did 
not ask for actual damages.241  That court’s inquiry into a plaintiff’s true 
purpose or goal is impermissible under Powell v. McCormack.242  The Court 
established in Powell that courts must hear cases where there is still an 
available remedy, regardless of whether the remedy is secondary or 
principal.243  Rather than look to what the complaint predominantly prays 
for, the court should take a closer look at the claim for nominal damages itself 
and determine whether the plaintiff sufficiently pled a past violation. 
B.  Taking a Closer Look 
This Part proposes a new standard where courts take a second look at the 
claim for nominal damages when the remaining remedies have become moot.  
This Part first outlines why this standard is a more balanced approach than 
the minority and majority rules.  Then, this Part establishes that it is a 
permissible standard under current Supreme Court precedent.  Finally, this 
Part argues that this conflict developed because of the lack of clarity from the 
Supreme Court on mootness and proposes that the Supreme Court should 
provide more clarity on the doctrine. 
 
of inferiority that results from segregation); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-1461, at 1 (1980) 
(explaining that people whose individual rights have been violated should not be prevented 
from seeking redress in federal court because their injury is not sufficiently economic). 
 237. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986); Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). 
 238. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 240. See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1264–65 
& n.16 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, 
138 S. Ct. 1326 (2018). 
 241. See id. at 1264–65. 
 242. 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). 
 243. See id. 
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1.  This Flexible Test Is a More Balanced Approach Than 
the Minority and Majority Rules 
Instead of determining whether the court has jurisdiction based solely on 
whether nominal damages have been pled, courts should determine whether 
the plaintiff has pled a specific incident or deprivation where he or she was 
affected by the challenged conduct.244  This inquiry would focus on whether 
the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury rather than whether a judgment 
would have some prospective practical effect.  This approach would prevent 
courts from dismissing cases where individual rights may have been violated.  
Courts would still be required to consider the specific incident that is alleged 
to be a constitutional violation, which would ensure that nominal damages 
function to remedy constitutional violations rather than as declaratory 
judgments. 
If the defendant is able to meet the high bar of the voluntary cessation 
exception245 and the court finds the claims for declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief are moot, this should tip the scale in favor of dismissing the 
claim for nominal damages as well.  Where a defendant has proved the 
challenged conduct will not recur, “judicial economy will dictate dismissal 
without the necessity of reaching the constitutional point.”246  However, 
“[t]here may be no mechanical rule for determining when the balance tips in 
favor of dismissal, especially when the necessity of weighing other factors is 
considered, but it is balancing that is required, not automatic dismissal.”247 
Therefore, the court should take a second, closer look at the claim for nominal 
damages and determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 
particularized deprivation of his or her rights.  For example, in Flanigan’s 
Enterprises, the plaintiffs could have alleged that they attempted to purchase 
the banned materials and, even though the statute was never enforced, 
businesses that previously sold these items no longer did so after the statute 
was enacted.248 
 
 244. Compare Soto v. City of Cambridge, 193 F. Supp. 3d 61, 71 (D. Mass. 2016) (noting 
that the statute was never enforced and did not affect the plaintiff), with Fitzgerald v. City of 
Portland, No. 14-CV-00053, 2014 WL 5473026, at *5 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2014) (holding that 
the plaintiff had shown there was an actual constitutional violation and the claim for nominal 
damages should move forward). 
 245. Generally, cases are not dismissed as moot where the defendant voluntarily ceases the 
challenged conduct unless the defendant has the burden to prove it is “absolutely clear that the 
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. 
Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). 
 246. See Kates & Barker, supra note 95, at 1410. 
 247. See id. at 1420. 
 248. See generally Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248 
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, 138 S. 
Ct. 1326 (2018). 
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The proposed standard is a slight shift from the incidental test previously 
used by the Second Circuit.249  In the incidental test, the courts looked at the 
underlying purpose of the suit to determine whether the claim for nominal 
damages was incidental to the moot claims.250  However, rather than the 
impermissible method that the Eleventh Circuit used,251 the Second Circuit 
decided whether the claim for nominal damages was incidental by 
determining whether the plaintiff was harmed or affected in any way by the 
challenged conduct.252  This is similar to the approach currently used by the 
district courts in the First Circuit.253 
Adopting this test would not represent a major shift from the majority rule.  
For instance, where the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the defendant 
deprived him or her of a constitutional right, the court would be unable to 
dismiss the case.254  This ensures that constitutional rights are vindicated by 
the courts with the appropriate remedy.  “[J]usticiability is ‘not a legal 
concept with a fixed content’” rather it is a doctrine “of uncertain and shifting 
contours.”255  And this rule would give courts more flexibility to determine 
if there is jurisdiction and to avoid advisory opinions.  This would ensure that 
courts adjudicate claims based on a specific incident involving a policy or 
statute rather than hypothetical facts.  For example, if a statute is challenged 
as unconstitutional but is later repealed, a court would be issuing an 
impermissible advisory opinion on what the law should be without 
adjudicating a specific incident. 
This approach would not disrupt the availability of attorney’s fees as to the 
cases that would be dismissed as moot because an award of nominal damages 
does not automatically confer reasonable attorney’s fees.256  The Supreme 
Court has held that a claim for nominal damages may not provide a basis for 
 
 249. See Kerrigan v. Boucher, 450 F.2d 487, 489–90 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[T]he claim for 
nominal damages, which is clearly incidental to the relief sought, cannot properly be the basis 
upon which a court should find a case or controversy where none in fact exists.”). 
 250. See id. 
 251. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 252. See Kerrigan, 450 F.2d at 489–90 (holding that an award of nominal damages was 
incidental because the plaintiff had already been made whole). 
 253. See supra notes 194–207 and accompanying text. 
 254. See Fitzgerald v. City of Portland, No. 14-CV-00053, 2014 WL 5473026, at *5 (D. 
Me. Oct. 27, 2014) (holding that a claim for nominal damages was not moot because the 
plaintiffs plausibly alleged a constitutional violation); supra Part III.A. 
 255. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 401 (1980) (first quoting Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961) (plurality opinion); then quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83, 97 (1968)). 
 256. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 117 (1992) (if the “victory is purely technical or 
de minimis, a district court need not go through the usual complexities involved in calculating 
attorney’s fees”); Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“[A] nominal damage award can be grounds for denying or reducing an attorney’s fee 
award.”); see also Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–
93 (1989) (“The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of 
the legal relationship . . . .  Where such a change has occurred, the degree of the plaintiff’s 
overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award . . . not to the availability of a fee 
award vel non.”). 
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attorney’s fees.257  However, most circuit courts have taken this to mean that 
attorney’s fees are not automatically unavailable, but rather it is within the 
courts discretion to determine if the fees are appropriate given the 
circumstances.258  The proposed standard only applies to cases at the 
periphery, where plaintiffs would be unable to show with particularity that 
they were deprived of constitutional protections by the defendant.  In these 
instances, even if nominal damages were awarded, a court may determine 
that the award of nominal damages is not a significant legal victory and be 
less likely to award attorney’s fees.259 
This flexible approach properly balances judicial economy and separation-
of-powers concerns while still vindicating plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  
First, this test prevents impermissible advisory opinions based on 
hypothetical facts.260  Further, this flexible rule allows courts to dismiss cases 
where there is not a sufficient basis to continue to hear the case.  Additionally, 
plaintiffs cannot manipulate jurisdiction under this rule.261  Plaintiffs would 
not be able to save the case merely by adding nominal damages as an 
additional remedy.  Instead, they would have to allege a specific 
constitutional deprivation. 
2.  A Closer Look Is Permissible Under Supreme Court Precedent 
The proposed flexible standard is more aligned with Supreme Court 
precedent than the minority and majority rules.  This test is permissible under 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Carey v. Piphus.  In that case, the Supreme 
Court held that, where the plaintiff proves a constitutional violation but 
cannot prove a compensable injury, the plaintiff’s award is limited to 
nominal, rather than compensatory, damages.262  The plaintiffs were 
specifically denied their due process right to a hearing, which would 
constitute a deprivation under this test.263  Therefore, here, where the 
plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an actual constitutional deprivation, the court 
would not have the discretion to dismiss the case.  However, where the 
plaintiff is unable to do so—for example, because the statute was not 
enforced nor abided by—the court would be permitted to dismiss the claim 
as moot. 
 
 257. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113–17. 
 258. See Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e find 
no case in which a court of appeals has interpreted Farrar to require the automatic denial of 
fees . . . when only nominal damages are awarded.”); Bos.’s Children First v. City of Boston, 
395 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (denying attorney’s fees where a nominal damages award was 
“a minimal success” and “d[id] not represent a victory on a significant legal issue”). 
 259. See, e.g., Bos.’s Children First, 395 F.3d at 18 (denying attorney’s fees where a 
nominal damages award was “a minimal success” and “d[id] not represent a victory on a 
significant legal issue”). 
 260. See Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1269 
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, 138 S. 
Ct. 1326 (2018). 
 261. See id. at 1270. 
 262. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1978). 
 263. See id. 
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Further, the Court’s ruling in in Arizonans for Official English supports a 
more exacting standard than the majority rule.264  In that case, the Supreme 
Court briefly touched upon the issue of nominal damages and mootness.265  
The Court ultimately dismissed the case as moot because nominal damages 
were an improper remedy266 and the state was not a proper party to the 
case.267  The Court chastised the Ninth Circuit for reading in a claim for 
nominal damages, which the plaintiffs did not request in the complaint and 
clearly added later only to save the case from dismissal—circumstances that 
deserved “close inspection.”268  This case implies that a claim for nominal 
damages may save an otherwise moot case but notes that these claims should 
be scrutinized.269  Taking a closer look at the underlying claim is consistent 
with the court’s reasoning and serves to ensure that the nominal damages are 
not pled to manipulate jurisdiction, but allows courts to hear factually 
supported claims. 
C.  The Supreme Court Should Clarify the Distinction Between 
Prudential and Constitutional Mootness 
One of the underlying reasons why this conflict developed is the unclear 
boundary of mootness.270  The blended constitutional and prudential 
considerations have caused confusion among courts.271  Courts are unable to 
differentiate between cases that are dismissed as moot because of 
constitutional restrictions or for discretionary prudential reasons.  For 
example, courts cite prudential reasons for both deciding a moot case272 and 
dismissing a case as moot.273  Generally, in the federal courts, mootness has 
centered on the requirements necessary to adjudicate a case on the merits.274  
The minority rule uses the doctrine of mootness to avoid adjudicating the 
 
 264. 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997). 
 265. See id.; see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. 
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 270. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
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 272. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 273. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 274. See supra Part I.B.2.a; see also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). 
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merits of a case.275  The Supreme Court should provide guidance and clarity 
on the boundaries and scope of constitutional and prudential mootness.  
Specifically, the Court should address when, if ever, judicial economy 
considerations might dictate dismissal of justiciable claims as moot. 
As highlighted by the exceptions to mootness, courts usually rely on 
prudential mootness to reach the merits of the case.  However, the courts 
applying the minority rule use prudential mootness as a doctrine to avoid 
adjudication.  These courts touch upon the Constitution, but they rely 
primarily on whether there is an effective judicial remedy, similar to the 
common-law doctrine of mootness.276  The common law focuses on the 
court’s ability to practically effect a dispute, beyond just determining the 
merits of the case.277  Courts further justify dismissing claims as moot 
because litigation wastes judicial resources278 and trivializes the business of 
federal courts.279  These reasons highlight lower courts’ need for Supreme 
Court guidance on the boundaries of prudential and constitutional mootness. 
Some scholars have called for a purely prudential doctrine of mootness.280  
A purely prudential doctrine would allow courts to dismiss any moot case or 
claim in its discretion.281  These scholars argue that courts adhere blindly to 
the mootness doctrine because they believe it is a constitutional limitation, 
rather than a judicially created doctrine.282  Although a justification for this 
application of mootness is judicial economy, when a case is dismissed at the 
appellate-court level, all the time and resources that have been invested in 
this case have been wasted.283  The purely prudential doctrine would allow 
courts to consider what has been invested in the case before dismissing it. 
However, this model would be a drastic shift from the current doctrine, 
which is “embedded in the case-or-controversy limitation imposed by the 
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Constitution.”284  This model unhinges a limitation on judicial power from 
the Constitution and would mean that the judiciary would be self-policed 
with only policy considerations to rely on.285  This would likely compound 
the issues with the current doctrine and lead to a system with even less 
guidance and consistency. 
Additionally, the Court could hold that the doctrine is purely a 
constitutional doctrine that is firmly ingrained in Article III.  Although courts 
would be able to consider the prudential aspects of mootness under this 
model, the prudential aspects would never be able to override the 
constitutional limitations.286  To hold that this doctrine is primarily 
constitutional and cannot be overridden would undermine courts’ ability to 
use the exceptions to this doctrine.287  In addition, the Court has 
acknowledged the prudential aspects of this doctrine by noting that the 
starting point of this doctrine is grounded in the Constitution while holding 
that it is permissible to reach the merits of the case when prudential 
considerations are compelling.288 
Finally, the Court could adopt a model which recognizes the dual policy 
and constitutional considerations of the doctrine.289  Adopting this dichotic 
model would help guide federal courts in determining when they are required 
to dismiss a case as moot, or when dismissal is within their discretion.290  
This would allow courts to determine in their discretion whether there are 
prudential reasons to dismiss the case as moot or compelling reasons to allow 
the claim to move forward. 
One way the Court could recognize the dual aspects of this doctrine would 
be by recognizing the implicit distinction between cases where the issue has 
become moot and where the plaintiff no longer has a personal stake.291  One 
commentator argues that courts already implicitly treat these two types of 
cases differently,292 so adopting this model would not be a shift in the law 
but rather would provide more guidance and require courts to be explicit in 
their analysis.  Where the issue has become moot, the court lacks jurisdiction 
and is required by the Constitution to dismiss the case as moot.293  Where the 
 
 284. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 412 (1980) (Powell, J., 
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 293. See Hall, supra note 105, at 565. 
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plaintiff’s personal stake has become moot, the court has the discretion to 
decide to dismiss the case as moot.294 
This model is consistent with the underlying policy of mootness.  In 
Flast,295 Chief Justice Warren explained that the jurisdictional requirements 
serve a two-fold purpose:  to limit the questions presented to federal courts 
to ones in an adversarial context and to ensure separation of powers.296  The 
personal stake and issue requirements are connected to the adversarial 
requirement.297  Where the issue has become moot, such as where a statute 
has been repealed, the plaintiff may not advocate as effectively because he 
or she may not be motivated to bring the same effort needed to succeed as 
one who is facing an unfavorable outcome—like the statute being upheld.298  
Conversely, where the plaintiff’s personal stake has become moot, such as 
where the passage of time has mooted injunctive and declaratory relief and 
there is no claim for damages, the plaintiff may continue to be motivated to 
pursue her claim in order to vindicate her constitutional rights. 
Applying such a rule to the conflict central to this Note would provide 
significantly more clarity to courts.  For example, allowing courts to have 
this explicit discretion would prevent the unnecessarily complicated, and 
incorrect, constitutional analysis that the Eleventh Circuit developed to avoid 
determining the merits of Flanigan’s Enterprises.299  If the Eleventh Circuit 
had the discretion to dismiss cases where the issue had become moot for 
prudential reasons—such as where a statute has been repealed—the court 
could have done so here, avoiding an incorrect constitutional analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
The conflict that has developed—whether or not to allow a claim for 
nominal damages to proceed when the claim is otherwise moot—has 
potentially allowed constitutional rights to go unvindicated.  Part of the 
reason this conflict has developed is because of the lack of clarity in the 
doctrine of mootness.  A minority of courts have sought to dismiss these 
claims for prudential reasons, which they have styled as dismissals for lack 
of jurisdiction.  Meanwhile, a majority of courts have held that complaints 
that have plausibly alleged a claim for nominal damages are sufficient for 
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court should clarify the 
doctrine of mootness and explain when dismissal is permissible and when it 
is mandatory.  Regardless of whether the Court takes up that issue, courts 
should adopt the flexible standard proposed in this Note, which will allow 
them to balance the competing concerns of judicial economy and vindicating 
plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional rights. 
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